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In passing the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), Congress's
purposes were to: "(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class
members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the Framers
of the United States Constitution by providing for federal court
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction;[]] and (3) benefit society by encouraging
1. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7
("As set forth in Article ITT of the Constitution, the Framers established
diversity jurisdiction to ensure fairness for all parties in litigation involving
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innovation and lowering consumer prices."2 Congress attempted to
achieve these goals by expanding diversity jurisdiction over class
action cases,3 allowing for concomitant removal 4 and preventing
plaintiffs from circumventing the first two with mass action
provisions.5 As written, these mass action provisions fail to achieve
Congress's stated purposes because they do not prevent plaintiffs
from averting the expanded scope of CAFA's diversity jurisdiction.
For a federal court to assert proper jurisdiction, each mass action
plaintiff must meet the restrictive amount in controversy requirement
of § 1332(a),6 instead of the $5 million aggregate amount required
persons from multiple jurisdictions, particularly cases in which defendants
from one state are sued in the local courts of another state. Interstate class
actions-which often involve millions of parties from numerous states-
present the precise concerns that diversity jurisdiction was designed to prevent:
frequently in such cases, there appears to be state court provincialism against
out-of-state defendants or a judicial failure to recognize the interests of other
states in the litigation.").
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2006) (Findings and Purposes).
3. § 1332(d)(2) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which (A)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.").
4. § 1453(b) ("IN GENERAL. A class action may be removed to a district
court of the United States in accordance with section 1446... (except that the
1-year limitation under section 1446(b) ... shall not apply), without regard to
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought,
except that such action may be removed by any defendant without the consent
of all defendants.").
5. § 1332(d)(I 1) ("(A) For purposes of this subsection and section
1453 ... a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action removable under
paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those
paragraphs. (B)(i) As used in subparagraph (A), the term 'mass action' means
any civil action (except a civil action within the scope of section 1711(2) ... )
in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be
tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions
of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs
whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements
under subsection (a).").
6. Presently, the amount in controversy of each individual claim must
exceed $75,000. § 1332(a).
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for class actions.7  By crafting this rule, Congress has created a
potential loophole that could thwart its purpose of providing federal
jurisdiction for "cases of national importance." 8 Currently, plaintiffs
can avoid federal jurisdiction by joining many smaller claims that
together exceed $5 million aggregate amount in controversy simply
because the claims were joined as a mass action, rather than a class
action. In essence, these provisions allow plaintiffs to make the very
end-run Congress feared they would make.9 As long as no single
plaintiff suffers an alleged loss in excess of $75,000, a group of
plaintiffs may decide not to file a class action under Rule 2310
because they can file a mass action using Rule 20 and remain in state
court. Even if a few plaintiffs exceed $75,000, the group only risks
losing those individuals; the rest remain in state court.
In conjunction with some of CAFA's other provisions, this end-
run causes additional problems. For example, nearly every mass
action removed results in at least two separate cases: one in state
court, consisting of the plaintiffs with smaller claims, and one in
federal court with those plaintiffs who meet the threshold amount in
controversy. Further, once the case is divided, there may no longer
be one hundred plaintiffs in federal court, as required by CAFA's
mass action definition. Finally, determining which claims count
toward the $5 million aggregate amount in controversy and trigger
the discretionary and mandatory remand provisions also becomes
more complicated. This Article, while not a comprehensive
discussion of the mass action provisions, endeavors to define "mass
action" using tools of statutory interpretation.11 This Article then
examines what the provisions actually require, points out anomalies
in the statute, and finally, suggests possible solutions to the problems
raised by the mass action amount in controversy requirement.
7. § 1332(d)(2).
8. See § 1711 note (Findings and Purposes).
9. See 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lott).
10. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
11. The two manners of statutory interpretation employed in this Article are
plain language interpretation and reference to congressional intent in enacting
the statute. See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the
Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-
Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 37-41 (1997).
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A. What Is a Mass Action?
With CAFA, 12 Congress sweeps somewhat broader than the
popular name of the statute suggests and addresses a separate set of
suits not within the realm of traditional class actions. 13 Known as
mass actions, 14 these suits combine large numbers of plaintiffs and
present the same problems CAFA is meant to address, such as forum
shopping, settlements exacted from defendants wary of placing the
entire company on the line, and attorney compensation
disproportionate to the recovery plaintiffs actually receive.1 5 In some
ways, mass actions "really are class actions in disguise."'16 However,
they are not subject to the procedural constraints of Rule 23 or
similar state procedural rules, and thus may be more susceptible to
forum shopping than class actions. In mass actions, the claims
joined are often substantively unrelated and can mislead juries who
do not realize that each plaintiff must prove every element of each
individual claim. 17 For these reasons, CAFA treats mass actions as
class actions' 8 when they fit requirements outlined in the diversity
jurisdiction' 9 and removal provisions. 20 But, the question still
remains, what is a mass action?
12. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (2006) (defining class action as covered by
CAFA).
14. § 1332(d)(1 1).
15. 151 CONG. REC. SI 109 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Brownback).
16. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner). Mass actions create the potential for abuse:
The mass action provision was included in the bill because mass
actions are really class actions in disguise. They involve an element of
people who want their claims adjudicated together, and they often
result in the same abuses as class actions. In fact, sometimes the
abuses are even worse because the lawyers seek to join claims that
have little to do with each other and confuse a jury into awarding
millions of dollars to individuals who have suffered no real injury.
Id.
17. Id.
18. § 1332(d)(1 1)(A) ("For purposes of this subsection and section
1453 ... a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action removable under
paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those
paragraphs.").
19. See supra Part 111.
20. See supra Part I for an analysis of CAFA's removal provisions.
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1. The Plain Language Definition of Mass Action
CAFA defines a mass action as:
any civil action (except a civil action within the scope of
section 1711(2))... in which monetary relief claims of 100
or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common
questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist
only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under
subsection (a).21
As a practical matter, this definition does little to clarify the types of
cases subject to federal courts' original or removal jurisdiction.
First, CAFA's plain language specifies that any civil action
covered by § 1711(2), or a class action filed under Rule 23, is not a
mass action. To constitute such an action, the claims of at least one
hundred persons, involving common questions of law or fact, must
be joined for trial.22 The statute places an important limit on these
plaintiffs: only those whose claims exceed the $75,000 requirement
of § 1332(a) fall within the scope of federal jurisdiction.
2 3
The plain language of CAFA further delineates what a mass
action is not. The statute carves out four types of cases which do not
qualify as mass actions removable to federal district court:
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or
occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and
that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States
contiguous to that State; (II) the claims are joined upon
motion of a defendant; (III) all of the claims in the action
are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on
behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported
class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing
such action; or (IV) the claims have been consolidated or
21. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(i).
22. Id.
23. Id. This limitation may be affected, however, by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,
which extends supplemental jurisdiction to plaintiffs whose claims are part of
the same constitutional case, but do not exceed the jurisdictional amount in
controversy of section 1332(a). 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005).
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coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.24
CAFA also places transfer restrictions on mass actions (at the
possible expense of judicial efficiency and scarce resources) 25 and
suspends the statute of limitations26 for all claims removed as a mass
action to federal court.
CAFA's plain language by no means provides clear guidelines
for attorneys or the judiciary. Congress left many terms undefined
and many issues unaddressed. Nevertheless, Congress did conduct
extensive hearings and debates-about the mass action provision in
particular-prior to CAFA's enactment.27  These legislative
explanations may "shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's
understanding" 28 of the mass action provision and may assist those
responsible for implementing CAFA to flesh out the statute's
complicated provision.
29
2. Legislative Intent Shapes Nebulous Mass Action Cloud
Congress included CAFA's mass action section to prevent
plaintiffs from creatively circumventing the class action provisions
by filing a mass action of identical proportions without using Rule
23.30 Senator Lott, in hearings prior to CAFA's passage, explained
24. § 1332(d)(l l)(B)(ii).
25. See § 1332(d)(l 1)(C)(i) ("Any action(s) removed to Federal court
pursuant to this subsection shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court
pursuant to section 1407 or the rules promulgated thereunder, unless a majority
of the plaintiffs in the action request transfer pursuant to section 1407.").
26. See § 1332(d)(1 1)(D) ("The limitations periods on any claims asserted
in a mass action that is removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsection
shall be deemed tolled during the period that the action is pending in Federal
court.").
27. E.g., 151 CONG. REC. H723 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005); 151 CoNG. REC.
S1076 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005); 151 CONG. REC. S1225 (daily ed. Feb. 10,
2005).
28. Exxon Mobil Corp., 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
29. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 861 (1992). Legislative history is not only
relevant to determining the legislative purpose in enacting legislation, but also
to assist in determining the meaning of specialized terms. See id.
30. 151 CoNG. REC. S 1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott).
This type of argument is often referred to as a "substance over form" debate
and is used in other legal contexts. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244, (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (requiring that courts "examine the
complaint to determine whether the substantive requirements [of SLUSA] have
been satisfied"); Arlia ex rel. Massey Energy Co. v. Blankenship, 234 F. Supp.
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that "[tihe mass action section was specifically included to prevent
plaintiffs' lawyers from making this end run. It will ensure that class
action-like cases are covered by the bill's jurisdictional provisions
even if the cases are not pleaded as class actions." 3' While some fear
that this section includes "large-scale personal injury cases resulting
from accidents, environmental disasters, or dangerous drugs that are
widely sold,, 32 Congress assured that mass actions are separate from
such "mass torts" and included this provision primarily to capture
states where class action certification does not exist.
33
a. "Mass action" is not synonymous with mass tort
Critics in the Senate feared that the mass action provision was
merely a tool to shift all personal injury cases to federal court,
thereby increasing the cost and burden of these actions and
ultimately delaying or denying plaintiffs their day in court. 34 Senator
Durbin expressed his personal concern with the provision:
I have tried to take a close look at the mass actions section
of this class action bill and ask how it would apply to a
mass tort situation. Mass torts are large-scale personal
injury cases resulting from accidents, environmental
disasters, or dangerous drugs that are widely sold. The
asbestos exposure situation we will be considering this year
is another example of a mass tort .... The supporters of the
bill claim that mass actions are not the same as mass torts
and that they have no desire to affect mass tort cases. I
know that is their position, but it is not what their bill says.
If the goal is to federalize all State personal injury cases,
2d 606, 608-09 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) (illustrating a defendant who urges the
court to find that the plaintiff attempted to disguise his claim as a shareholder
derivative suit when it was actually a securities fraud class action so that it
would not be removable to federal court under the Securities Litigation
Uniform Act (SLUSA)); Lander v. Hartford Life & Amity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d
101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that Congress meant for courts to look to the
substance of the claim rather than relying wholly on the form the lawsuit
takes).
31. 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott).
32. Id. at S 1099 (statement of Sen. Durbin).
33. Id.
34. 151 CONG. REC. S1243 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("Federalizing these individual cases will no doubt delay, and possibly
deny, justice for victims suffering real injuries.").
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supporters should be open about it and say it publicly.
35
Critics also feared that suits alleging serious harm or death due to the
drug Vioxx would be automatically removable by defendant Merck
to federal court, where the company could defend its case to a more
sympathetic ear.
36
In light of critics' fears, Senator Durbin proposed an amendment
to the bill that would permit state courts to consolidate mass tort
cases for their convenience and efficiency without the possibility of
losing jurisdiction to a federal court.37 This amendment would have
added "or by the court sua sponte" to the exemption for claims
consolidated by a defendant. 38 Senator Durbin's proposal prompted
speedy clarification from the bill's proponents. 39 As Senator Lott
explained, mass actions are not the same as mass torts:
Some of my colleagues will oppose this mass actions
provision and will want to gut it by making an effort to
confuse mass actions with mass torts. I realize we are kind
of getting into a legalese discussion, but words make a
difference when you are considering a bill such as this. I
am very concerned that the real motive is to render this
provision meaningless, thereby creating a loophole for the
trial lawyers to basically get a class action by another name.
Mass torts and mass actions are not the same. The
phrase "mass torts" refers to a situation in which many
persons are injured by the same underlying cause, such as a
single explosion, a series of events, or exposure to a
particular product. In contrast, the phrase "mass action"
refers to a specific type of lawsuit in which a large number
of plaintiffs seek to have all their claims adjudicated in one
35. 151 CONG. REC. S1099-100 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
36. Id. at Si100 (describing some individual Vioxx cases and the New
Jersey, Merck's headquarters, mass tort court system that Senator Durbin fears
would lose jurisdiction over all mass tort claims consolidated by the New
Jersey court system for efficiency).
37. Id. at S1101 (proposing to add "or by the court sua sponte" to
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(11), providing "the claims are joined upon motion of a
defendant or by the court sua sponte").
38. Id.
39. 151 CoNG. REc. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lott).
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combined trial. Mass actions are basically disguised class
actions.40
More specifically, the provision was intended to ensure that in states
without class action certification, suits joining many plaintiffs'
claims for adjudication in one trial, essentially class actions without
such status, would be treated the same as actions in states with
41procedural rules akin to Rule 23. Senator Lott continued:
There are a few States, such as my State-[Mississippi],
which do not provide a class action device. In those States,
plaintiffs' lawyers often bring together hundreds,
sometimes thousands of plaintiffs to try their claims jointly
without having to meet the class action requirements, and
often the claims of the multiple plaintiffs have little to do
with each other. There was an instance in my State where
you had more plaintiffs in one of these mass actions than
you had people in the county, more than the residents in the
county. Under the mass action provision, defendants will
be able to remove these mass actions to Federal court under
the same circumstances in which they will be able to
remove class actions. However, a Federal court would only
exercise jurisdiction over those claims meeting the $75,000
minimum threshold. To be clear, in order for a Federal
court to take jurisdiction over a mass action, under this bill
there must be more than 100 plaintiffs, minimal diversity
must exist, and the total amount in controversy must exceed
$5 million. In other words, the same safeguards that apply
42to removal of class actions would apply to mass actions.
Satisfied with this explanation, Senator Durbin withdrew his
amendment 43 and signaled to critics that the mass action provision
would indeed be narrowly read:
44
I heard from proponents.., that the bill is designed to
affect only mass actions and not mass torts .... I am glad
that the proponents of this bill agree with me that there is a
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 151 CONG. REC. S1236 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
44. Id. at S1235-36.
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very significant difference between these two types of
cases. Mass torts are large scale personal injury cases that
result from accidents, environmental disasters, or dangerous
drugs that are widely sold.
Cases like Vioxx ... and cases arising from asbestos
exposure, are examples of mass torts. These personal
injury claims are usually based on State laws, and almost
every State has well established rules of procedure to allow
their State courts to customize the needs of their litigants in
these complex cases....
So, it seems to me that the authors of this bill are trying
to include only these so-called mass actions and not mass
torts.
And I understand from the statements made by Senator
Lott, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and many other
proponents of the bill, that these so-called mass actions are
currently filed only in Mississippi and West Virginia. In
other words, this provision of S. 5 will have no impact on
mass torts cases filed in the other 48 States ....
I agree with the proponents that the scope of this
language is limited.
It is my understanding.., that a mass action, as used
in this section of the bill, is simply a procedural device
designed to aggregate for trial numerous claims. If that is
the case, I believe my amendment would not be
necessary.
45
But if CAFA's mass action provision encompasses only a single
procedural device in two states that do not provide class action
certification, it does not seem to have much bite, especially in light
of recent Mississippi "tort reform" legislation and Mississippi
Supreme Court decisions limiting the use of state joinder and
consolidation operations.46
45. Id.
46. See MiSS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-64 (2002) (repealed 2004); MS Life Ins.
Co. v. Baker, 905 So. 2d 1179 (Miss. 2005) (calling for stricter interpretation
and application of permissive joinder rule); Harold's Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493, 495 (Miss. 2004) (calling for severance of an
asbestos mass tort litigation because the plaintiffs' attorney failed to allege
sufficient facts as to each plaintiff to establish proper joinder).
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b. Defining "mass action" in light of congressional intent
How courts interpret "mass action" will depend largely on the
degree to which they adhere to the plain language of the statute and
incorporate congressional intent. Courts regularly attempt to discern
legislative intent and look beyond the four corners of the statute to
find it.47 In particular, courts look to the "plain meaning of the
statute's words, enlightened by their context and the
contemporaneous legislative history [and] the historical context of
the statute, . . and the specific sequence of events leading to [its]
,,48passage. Courts generally will not turn to legislative intent when
statutory language is unambiguous. 49 However, if the legislature's
purpose is particularly compelling, "the legislative history may make
the obvious unwarranted and might require another construction.,
50
Some courts have gone even further and declared that "one may
resort to explanatory legislative history 'no matter how clear the
words' of a statute may appear on a superficial examination.,
51
If courts use the textualist method and rely solely on the
language of the statute, then CAFA's mass action section may apply
to actions joined by the court sua sponte for trial purposes. The plain
language does not preclude removal of such actions to federal court.
On the contrary, it may suggest that these types of actions should be
removed. For instance, § 1332(b)(1 1)(B)(ii)(IV) states that cases
consolidated for pretrial purposes may not be removed, but it says
nothing about consolidation by court sua sponte for trial purposes.
52
However, if courts also consider congressional intent, they may
read the mass action provision to exclude all but a very narrow class
of cases. As CAFA is relatively new, and courts have not reviewed a
single case involving the interpretation of its mass action provisions,
it is not clear which approach the courts will adopt. In other words,
predicting how the courts will interpret CAFA and its mass action
47. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734 (2005)
(citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004))
(interpreting the statute in light of its "text, structure, purpose, and history").
48. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987)).
49. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
50. Rota v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 338 F. Supp. 1176, 1180
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S.
41, 48 (1928)).
51. Id. (citing Harrison v. N. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943)).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)( IV) (2006).
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provisions is difficult at best, and amounts to predicting the World
Series champion during spring training at worst. Nevertheless, there
are a few distinct possibilities.
When courts interpret a new statute, their goal is to elucidate the
meaning of the legislature's words. Following the Supreme Court's
lead, they look first to the plain language and "presume that [the]
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there." 53 If the language is unambiguous, that is often where
the "inquiry begins ... and ends. 54 However, further analysis of
legislative intent is not entirely precluded.55
To decide whether to consult the Congressional Record for
direction, courts may use a sliding scale method of statutory
interpretation: "[T]he plainer the language of the statute, the more
convincing contrary legislative history must be" to interpret the
statute in such a contrary manner.56 Because mass action provisions
are less than clear, and the legislative history is particularly
illuminating, the record seems to warrant courts' consideration.
The limiting language comes not from the removal exceptions,
but rather from the narrow definition of "mass action" introduced in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 57 The day before
CAFA became law, Representative Sensenbrenner clarified the scope
of the mass action provisions:
New subsection 1332(d)(1 1) expands Federal jurisdiction
over mass actions-suits that are brought on behalf of
numerous named plaintiffs who claim that their suits
present common questions of law or fact that should be
tried together even though they do not seek class
certification status .... Under subsection 1332(d)(1 1), any
civil action in which 100 or more named parties seek to try
their claims for monetary relief together will be treated as a
class action for jurisdictional purposes. The Sponsors wish
to stress that a complaint in which 100 or more plaintiffs
53. Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (quoting Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
54. Id. (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534).
55. See Rota, 338 F. Supp. at 1180.
56. Ganz v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 963 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Alaska 1998)
(quoting Chokwak v. Worley, 912 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Alaska 1996)).
57. 151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
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are named fits the criteria of seeking to try their claims
together, because there would be no other apparent reason
to include all of those claimants in a single action unless the
intent was to secure a joint trial of the claims asserted in the
action.
58
This indicates that plaintiffs' attorneys must file mass actions as such
and include at least one hundred or more names in the complaint.
59
In addition, the most logical reading of "proposed to be tried
jointly, 60 leads to the conclusion that Congress meant only for
claims joined willfully by the plaintiff under Rule 20(a) 61 or a state
equivalent 62 to be treated as a class action subject to § 1332(d)(2)-
(10). In other words, only those actions that most closely resemble a
Rule 23 class action should be subject to CAFA. While this
language may broaden the scope of "mass actions" beyond cases
filed in Mississippi and West Virginia, it excludes from federal
jurisdiction suits filed by independent plaintiffs or smaller mass
actions with less than one hundred individuals. It would also exclude
actions consolidated for pretrial and trial purposes by state courts for
efficient adjudication.
63
This interpretation of CAFA is most logical because joinder and
consolidation are distinct procedures. If Congress intended to
encompass "class actions in disguise" 64 and prevent plaintiffs from
making an end run on the class action provisions, 65 interpreting
"proposed to be tried jointly," to mean joined by the plaintiffs-not a
court-would accomplish Congress's goal. Concerns of "artful
pleading" might still arise if plaintiffs' attorneys file numerous mass
tort complaints, each naming ninety-nine plaintiffs, and thus force a
state judge to consolidate the cases for adjudication. Such pleading
resembles willful joinder by the plaintiffs. In this event, defendants
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) (2006).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
62. E.g., MiSs. R. CTV. P. 20(a) (West 2005).
63. 151 CoNG. REC. SI 100 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
64. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
65. 151 CoNG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lott).
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could invoke the policy statement in CAFA's Official Senate Report
to persuade federal judges to accept consolidated mass tort cases
removed from state court.
66
If courts use the Congressional Record to construe the term
"mass action" most narrowly, encompassing only cases with claims
joined under liberal West Virginia or Mississippi statutes, defendants
likely will not invoke the mass action provision as a means to
remove a suit to federal court. Given these narrow parameters of
legislative purpose, the opportunity to do so would not often arise.
However, should courts include suits with claims joined under other
state joinder rules, but exclude cases consolidated by state judges,
defense attorneys might invoke CAFA's mass action provisions more
often as a means to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing its class
action provisions. As a variation of this, a judge may also allow
removal of a consolidated case if she finds that the plaintiffs'
attorney intended to overwhelm the court with multiple smaller mass
tort actions.
Finally, if courts interpret "mass action" according to the plain
language of the statute, when a plaintiffs' attorney files a complaint
naming one hundred or more plaintiffs and alleging more than $5
million in damages, a defendant can invoke CAFA and remove the
entire case to federal court. This interpretation protects smaller
groups of plaintiffs who file mass tort actions in good faith after
suffering real injuries; it does not include cases consolidated by
judges for convenience's sake. Overall, the simplest interpretation
would be that "proposed to be tried jointly" is synonymous with
"joined" under joinder rules. This gives effect to the legislative
intent, but does so without venturing outside the language of the
statute. It also quells Senator Durbin's fears that mass torts will be
swept into CAFA's grasp.
Proponents and defendants may be frustrated by the narrow
scope of CAFA's mass action provisions. By construing the term
narrowly, but consistently with the plain language of the statute,
66. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
41. Senator Specter asserted the following, "Overall, new section 1332(d) is
intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions.
Its provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate
class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any
defendant." Id.
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courts may ensure that only those cases that are truly class actions in
sheep's clothing are subject to CAFA. From the Congressional
Record, one can infer that Senator Durbin would not have removed
his amendment from consideration if he feared that judicially
consolidated actions, such as those in New Jersey, would not be
given continued effect.
67
On the other hand, the overarching goal of the mass action
provisions is to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from circumventing
CAFA's class action requirements.6 8  To that end, courts should
interpret the statute to give district court judges discretion to permit
removal of consolidated actions if it appears the plaintiffs' attorney
filed many smaller mass actions to force the state trial court judge to
consolidate. In this way, courts will heed both the statutory language
and legislative intent and will fulfill CAFA's overarching policy of
ensuring that federal courts adjudicate "class actions in disguise."
69
B. What Do CAFA's Provisions Actually Require?
For a federal court to assert jurisdiction under CAFA's mass
action provision, the claims of one hundred or more persons seeking
monetary relief must be joined for trial because they share common
questions of law or fact.70 Individual claims, however, must meet the
amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(a).71  If these
requirements are met, and the case does not fall within an exception
under § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii), then the jurisdictional and removal
sections applicable to class actions also apply to qualifying mass
actions. 72  This means that the $5 million aggregate amount in
controversy provision as well as the discretionary and mandatory
remand provisions, 73 would apply to mass actions.
On its face, the mass action provision may seem simple enough,
but when read in the context of the entire statute as the Supreme
67. 151 CONG. REC. S1235 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
68. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
69. Id.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) (2006).
71. Id.
72. § 1332(d)(1 1)(A). For a detailed anaylsis of the jurisdictional and
removal sections, see supra Parts I & 11.
73. § 1332(d)(3), (4)(A)(i)(I).
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Court requires, 74 simple phrases give way to anomalous and
complicated, although not ambiguous, applications.
1. CAFA requires each plaintiff in a mass action
to meet the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
requirement of § 1332(a), but Exxon suggests § 1367 should apply
The plain language of CAFA suggests that Congress intended
federal courts to assert jurisdiction over only those plaintiffs named
in the mass action whose monetary claims exceed the $75,000
minimum required by § 1332(a),75  without aggregation or
supplemental jurisdiction. 76  Senator Dodd affirmed Congress's
intent to treat mass action plaintiffs more like individual plaintiffs,
and via the compromise bill, to subject their claims to federal
jurisdiction only if those claims exceed $75,000. 77 As noted in the
Congressional Record, "[t]he compromise changes the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Federal jurisdiction shall only exist over those
persons whose claims satisfy the normal diversity jurisdictional
amount requirement for individual actions under current law
(presently $75,000).,78 However, if a federal court interprets the
absence of § 1367 from the mass action provisions as an ambiguity,
the Congressional Record may provide an answer contrary to what
the plain language suggests. For instance, Representative
Sensenbrenner posited that a court could apply supplemental
jurisdiction to smaller claims in the mass action context.
79
Even if CAFA's plain language interpretation prevails, timing
might be critical to a court's analysis: Senator Dodd's statement and
key congressional compromises occurred prior to the Supreme
Court's clarification of § 1367(b) in Exxon.80 When Senator Dodd
explained that "[flederal jurisdiction shall only exist over those
74. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 35 36 (1998).
75. § 1332(d)(l1)(B).
76. § 1367.
77. 151 CONG. REC. S1078 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dodd).
78. Id.
79. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner).
80. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620-21
(2005).
October 2006] 1083
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1067
persons whose claims satisfy the normal diversity jurisdictional
amount requirement for individual actions under current law,' 8'1 he
was operating in a pre-Exxon world, when the law required each
plaintiff to individually meet the $75,000 amount in controversy
requirement.
In Exxon, the Supreme Court clarified the traditional § 1332(a)
amount in controversy requirement and its application to
supplemental jurisdiction.8 2 Specifically, the Court held that in both
class actions and product liability cases, federal courts may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising out of the same case or
controversy, but which fall below $75,000, as long as one plaintiff
meets the threshold requirement and sufficient diversity exists among
the parties.8 3 If such "traditional" claims are subject to § 1367, then
under CAFA's policy, the claims of mass action plaintiffs should
also be subject to supplemental jurisdiction.
Exxon did not change the § 1332(a) complete diversity
requirement, and the Court deferred to Congress to determine the
"other elements of jurisdiction," 84 within the parameters of Article
111.85 With CAFA, Congress decided that for qualifying class actions
and mass actions, federal courts may exercise original jurisdiction
over an entire case or controversy, provided the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity exists.
86
81. 151 CONG. REC. S1078 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dodd).
82. Exxon Mobil Corp., 125 S. Ct. at 2620 21.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 2615.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in
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Under post-Exxon law then, a federal court should be able to exercise
jurisdiction over all claims in a class action, as long as one monetary
claim exceeds $75,000, the total amount in controversy exceeds $5
million, and minimal diversity exists. Likewise, as long as mass
actions qualify under CAFA as "class actions in disguise,' 87 they too
should be subject to the same rules, and § 1367 should apply to §
1332(d)(1 1). Yet, this conclusion conflicts with the plain language
of the statute, congressional intent, and pre-Exxon jurisprudence.
a. Supplemental jurisdiction in light of
CAFA 's plain language and congressional intent
CAFA's text and legislative history suggest that Congress did
not intend supplemental jurisdiction to apply to mass actions,
Representative Sensenbrenner's opinion notwithstanding.8 8  In
contrast to CAFA's $5 million aggregation requirement,8 9 the mass
action provision seems to codify the Supreme Court's holding in
Zahn v. International Paper Co.90 Yet, as with many of CAFA's
other provisions, further analysis reveals a potential problem. Zahn
required each plaintiff in a class action to satisfy the amount in
controversy and thus prohibited aggregation of claims and the
application of supplemental jurisdiction to claims below the $75,000
threshold.91 In Exxon, the Supreme Court held that Congress's
enactment of § 136792 in 1990 effectively overruled Zahn.93 The
which-(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs
is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state and any
defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a class of
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State any defendant is a foreign state or a
citizen or subject of a foreign state.
87. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
88. Id. ("I would like to stress that this [mass action] provision in no way is
intended to abrogate [2]8 United States Code [1367] to narrow current
jurisdictional rules. Thus, if a Federal court believed it to be appropriate, the
court could apply supplemental jurisdiction in the mass action context as
well.").
89. § 1332(d)(2).
90. 414 U.S. 291, 294 95 (1973).
91. See id.
92. § 1367.
93. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2627
(2005).
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Court also went on to state that CAFA played no role in this
decision, 94 leaving Congress free to restrict the application of § 1367
through its legislative powers. The question remains whether
Congress has the power to explicitly limit the application of § 1367
to traditional diversity actions. Because § 1367 is a creature of
statute, and because Congress is vested with "[a]ll legislative
Powers, ' 95 it would seem Congress has the authority to exclude
CAFA mass actions from the ambit of § 1367.96
On the other hand, preventing federal jurisdiction over
individual mass action claims that do not satisfy the § 1332(a)
amount in controversy requirement may fly in the face of Congress's
purpose for enacting CAFA: "[To] restore the intent of the framers of
the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction .... ,,97 Congress may have consciously
contradicted this policy by providing that each mass action plaintiff
must meet the § 1332(a) amount in controversy requirement.
Consequently, courts cannot apply Exxon to mass actions filed in or
removed to federal court under CAFA and must remand any claims
that do not exceed $75,000 to state court.
b. Judicial efficiency may support applying § 1367
For the sake of judicial efficiency, district courts might instead
follow Exxon and Representative Sensenbrenner's position" in the
mass action context and permit supplemental jurisdiction as a logical
extension of § 1332(a). Supplemental jurisdiction would alleviate
judicial headaches caused by retaining some claims in federal court
and remanding others to state court. For instance, courts might avoid
complications associated with adjudicating nearly identical claims
and facts in multiple venues or determining which claims count
toward the aggregate $5 million and which plaintiffs count toward
94. Id. at 2627 28.
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
96. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2619 (citing Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545, 556
(1989) (stating that "[w]hatever we [the Court] say regarding the scope of
jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by
Congress")).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2006) (Findings and Purposes).
98. 151 CONG. REC. H723, H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner); see also supra note 88.
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the 1/3 or 2/3 remand thresholds.
99
To simplify an already complicated landscape, courts may
decide that conserving judicial resources is a sufficiently sound
reason for applying § 1367 to mass actions. This would permit
federal courts to assert supplemental jurisdiction over mass action
claims that do not exceed $75,000 when at least one plaintiff satisfies
the § 1332(a) amount in controversy requirement, minimal diversity
exists, and claims in the aggregate exceed $5 million. However,
while applying § 1367 seems logical, the unambiguous language of
the mass action provision does not coincide with the Court's decision
in Exxon. There, the Court determined that once a district court has
original jurisdiction over one claim, it can exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims joined under Rule 20 or 23, even
though those claims do not exceed the amount in controversy
requirement. 00 Adhering to the Court's reasoning in Exxon might
allow a district court to avoid this conflict; however, it may also
encroach on the constitutional mandate that "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States .... "'0' Thus, a court may reject the Exxon analysis in an
effort to avoid a constitutional conflict, but in doing so, may
nevertheless cause substantial delay and waste of judicial resources.
2. If courts do not apply § 1367 to mass actions, other pitfalls await
a. Fractionated cases may clog state and federal court dockets
If CAFA, as written, precludes application of § 1367 to mass
action claims, large mass actions will likely be split among at least
one federal court and several state courts. 102  This would occur
whenever one hundred or more plaintiffs join their claims for the
purposes of trial, all monetary claims together exceed $5 million,
minimal diversity exists, and one or more claims fail to exceed
$75,000. A federal court would remand the individual "small"
claims to state court, and two or more cases with virtually identical
facts would be litigated in state and federal courts simultaneously-a
99. See GEORGENE M. VA1RO, THE CLASS ACT1ON FA1RNESS ACT OF 2005:
A REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 34 35 (2005).
100. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
101. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
102. VAIRO, supra note 99, at 34.
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result counter to goals of efficiency and uniformity.
The expense and inconvenience of litigating in multiple fora
may discourage defendants from using CAFA to remove mass
actions in the first place. This reluctance would frustrate Congress's
intent if cases or claims of national importance remain in state court.
More importantly, with courts powerless to apply § 1367 to
supplemental claims, the mass action provision allows plaintiffs'
attorneys to do exactly what Congress feared they might do-an end-
run around CAFA's class action provisions. In a suit against a
national corporation, such as Walmart, with a retail location in the
forum state, an attorney could join 1,000 plaintiffs from across the
country, each alleging $5,000 in damages, and one plaintiff claiming
$75,001. This scenario is not difficult to imagine.
Under these circumstances, Exxon and CAFA accomplish
nothing. The plaintiffs, far more than one hundred, were joined for
the purpose of trial, and as long as one defendant and one plaintiff
are from the forum state, the case will remain in state court, thereby
frustrating CAFA's overarching policies. If, however, only the class
action provisions apply, the result is different. As long as one
plaintiff is from a different state than any one defendant, and the one-
third and two-third provisions are satisfied, a federal district court
may assert jurisdiction because the aggregate damages are
$6,075,001, well above the $5 million requirement. If § 1367
applies, as it would for class actions not filed under CAFA or for
ordinary diversity cases, the court may assert supplemental
jurisdiction over 999 plaintiffs, as long as the one plaintiff with a
claim exceeding $75,000 is diverse in citizenship from all
defendants. Because only minimal diversity is required for original
jurisdiction under CAFA, a federal court could exercise jurisdiction
over all 1,000 claims.
This avoids the illogical result of the district court exerting
jurisdiction over only one plaintiff who suffered $75,001 in damages.
Because they may exclude anyone who suffered more than $75,000
worth of damage and remain in state court, attorneys may
deliberately select their plaintiffs to avoid those with the greatest
harm. Selecting plaintiffs in this way would not only circumvent
CAFA's jurisdictional provisions, but would also neglect plaintiffs
with perhaps the greatest need for relief. These individuals would
have to seek out other counsel and file separately, thereby
1088
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contributing to the expense and inefficiency of litigating several
similar claims in multiple fora. This too undermines CAFA's
purpose and encourages litigation tactics which may stymie-rather
than improve-access to the courts. Logic and public policy should
not permit this result.
b. Split cases make counting plaintiffs
much more difficult than 1-2-3
For a defendant to remove a mass action to federal court, the
complaint must include one hundred or more plaintiffs, and the
aggregate amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The
federal judge must then examine the case to make sure it satisfies all
the elements of a CAFA mass action. Suppose, in a case like the
Walmart hypothetical above, the claims of only twenty out of 1,000
plaintiffs exceed $75,000. CAFA requires the federal court to retain
jurisdiction over those claims and remand the claims of the
remaining 980 plaintiffs to state court. Suddenly, the case that
remains in federal court no longer includes at least one hundred
plaintiffs, and unless the individual amounts in controversy of the
twenty plaintiffs exceed $250,000, the $5 million aggregate would
not be met either. This result begs the question, is the case in federal
court with less than one hundred plaintiffs still a mass action?
10 3
Representative Sensenbrenner addressed this problem, and
commented that the federal court should not be divested of
jurisdiction if losing the remanded claims brings the case below
either the one hundred plaintiff requirement or the $5 million
aggregate. 104 However, as this issue has not yet been litigated, no
one can say for sure whether courts will follow Representative
Sensenbrenner's reasoning. It does seem inefficient for courts to
consider whether they should retain jurisdiction under these
circumstances, especially if both the policy of CAFA and the
Supreme Court decision in Exxon weigh in favor of supplemental
jurisdiction over the remanded claims.
If the amount in controversy requirement remains written "as
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)( 11)(B)(i) (2006). This section specifies that, to be
a mass action, a suit must include the "monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons." Id.
104. 151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
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is," further problems may arise in counting plaintiffs. CAFA requires
that the count be determined on the date that the plaintiff filed the
original complaint or when plaintiffs amend the complaint." 5 This
means that with every recount, the federal court could gain or lose
jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional battle could continue until there is
a final judgment or settlement in the case. 106 Extensive jurisdictional
battles may actually encourage parties to reach premature settlements
without due consideration of plaintiffs' best interests. In fact, this
was a major concern of CAFA's 10 7 drafters, who included a
consumer bill of rights among the statute's detailed provisions.' 0 8 If
federal courts cannot assert jurisdiction over the claims of all
plaintiffs named in the complaint, then the case that remains in
federal court looks nothing like the mass action that the plaintiff
originally filed, or the large, multi-state mass action Congress
believed ought to be heard in a neutral forum.
10 9
The inclusion of the $75,000 minimum defeats the dual aims of
CAFA. First, lawyers can easily keep large cases with national
implications in state court by choosing only, or primarily, small-
claims plaintiffs. Second, even if a part of the case remains in
federal court, it may be inefficient, split between at least two fora,
and lacking national implications. The effect of splitting cases
among multiple fora, with federal courts able to assert jurisdiction
over only outlier plaintiffs, strays far from CAFA's goal of ensuring
that federal courts adjudicate mass actions and class actions under
the same circumstances.' 0 If federal courts treat qualifying mass
actions as class actions, requiring only the $5 million aggregate
amount in controversy, 111 or if courts apply § 1367 as required by
Exxon, this problem will vanish, along with the time and money
105. 151 CONG. REC. S1 105 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
106. VA1RO, supra note 99, at 35.
107. See 151 CONG. REC. S1081 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lott) ("[CAFA] places limitations on contingency awards for attorneys in
coupon settlement cases.").
108. See §§ 1711-15. For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see infra
Part V.
109. See 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
1 10. See id.
S111. See § 1332(d)(2).
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spent litigating this complex, yet ancillary, issue.
c. Fewer plaintif with large claims may not add up to $5 million
Questions also arise as to CAFA's amount in controversy
requirement. 12 For a case to qualify as a either a class action or a
mass action, the aggregate amount in controversy must exceed $5
million." 3 The reason for such a high threshold is two-fold. First,
because Congress abandoned complete diversity with CAFA, this
new requirement ensures that enough is at stake to justify the
expansion of diversity jurisdiction. Second, Congress sought to
ensure that only the largest, bet-the-company cases could be heard in
federal court, thus allocating scarce judicial resources to cases with
the greatest national significance.' 14 Notably, the statute is silent as
to whether the federal court can assert jurisdiction over the claims of
fewer than one hundred plaintiffs when the aggregate amount in
controversy is less than $5 million. The absence of any language
reconciling the $5 million aggregate with the $75,000 mass action
provision is further evidence of the anomalies that are exposed when
a litigant or a judge attempts to read the statute as a whole.
In the Walmart hypothetical, if the federal court exercises
jurisdiction over the claims of only twenty plaintiffs, whose average
individual claim for damages is $80,000, their aggregate $1.6 million
is far from the threshold amount required by CAFA. Should the
federal court remand to state court claims exceeding $75,000? The
language of CAFA does not provide a clear answer to this question.
Likewise, it is not clear what would happen if remand of the
smaller claims to state court created complete diversity among the
remaining plaintiffs and defendants. Should CAFA no longer be the
basis for removal if the defendants could simply remove under §
1441?115 If so, under Exxon, some of the smaller claims already
remanded to state courts could re-enter federal court by virtue of §
1367, if the plaintiffs are completely diverse from all defendants.
This would be possible without courts relying on CAFA for federal
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. § 1711 note (Findings and Purposes).
115. § 1441; see supra Part 11 (discussing why CAFA's removal statute §
1453 quite possibly applies to cases not meeting § 1332(d)(2) but that meet the
"traditional" diversity requirements of § 1332(a) as now impacted by Exxon).
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jurisdiction. Again, CAFA would fail to achieve the goal Congress
set out to accomplish: to bring large cases of national significance
before federal courts.
Moreover, even if courts interpreted CAFA to permit federal
jurisdiction over claims exceeding $75,000 but not piercing the $5
million threshold, courts would controvert Congress's intent to keep
federal fora open to defendants only in cases of potentially large-
scale impact. A case involving far fewer than one hundred plaintiffs
with individual damages greater than $75,000, but whose aggregate
damage does not exceed $5 million, does not embody Congress's
vision of a mass action.'' 6 In this sense, the $75,000 mass action
requirement is incongruous with the $5 million aggregate
requirement. Either the courts or the legislature must iron out these
inconsistencies, and due to possible separation of powers concerns,
Congress may be best suited for this task. 1 7 Regardless, these issues
must be addressed.
d. Counting 113 or 213 ofplaintiffs
is difficult when they are not in the same forum
Once a defendant removes a mass action to federal court, the
court must still decide whether jurisdiction is proper under the
mandatory and discretionary tests set out in CAFA.118 These tests
depend largely on the citizenship of the defendants and the
plaintiffs. 1 9 Specifically, the language "members of all proposed
plaintiff classes in the aggregate" 120 presents problems in the mass
action context. Who are the "members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate"?
121
In the Walmart hypothetical, the relevant plaintiffs may be the
twenty plaintiffs whose claims remain under federal jurisdiction.
Greater than one-third would be seven or more plaintiffs, and greater
than two-thirds would be fourteen plaintiffs. On the other hand, the
relevant plaintiffs may be all of the plaintiffs named in the original
116. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(i).
117. Cf N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971)
(emphasizing the importance of separation of powers).
118. § 1332(d)(3) (4). For a detailed analysis of the implications of these
discretionary and mandatory remand provisions, see supra Part 111.
119. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
120. § 1332(d)(3)-(4)(A)(i)(I).
121. Id.
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complaint, which, in the Walmart hypothetical, would total 1,000.
If the members of all proposed plaintiff classes include plaintiffs
named in the original complaint, but whose claims are subsequently
remanded to state court for failure to exceed $75,000, then attorneys
have a powerful tool to make a complete end-run around CAFA.
They could easily circumvent CAFA by gathering numerous local
plaintiffs who suffered very little harm and include them in the
complaint. Plaintiffs could amend the complaint this way at any time
while the suit is pending, and the federal court would then have to re-
count plaintiffs. 22 If, at any point prior to judgment or settlement,
the case includes the requisite number of local plaintiffs, the federal
court could be divested of jurisdiction. 123 Because of these potential
jurisdictional inconsistencies, scholars predict that courts are unlikely
to interpret the statutory language to include local plaintiffs whose
claims are remanded to state court. 124 However, this question has
yet to be litigated. Thus, it is not clear whether courts would include
these plaintiffs in the original count, or in any subsequent count (i.e.,
after plaintiffs amend the complaint).
125
Plaintiffs' attorneys may make a strong argument that state
plaintiffs should count based on the plain language of the statute.
The possibility that courts might interpret CAFA in this way would
encourage attorneys to include many smaller claims of local
plaintiffs and thereby ensure remand to state court. This single issue
could clog federal court dockets and ultimately, keep mass actions in
state court. As a result, the mass action provisions fail to ensure
without doubt that cases with national significance, implicating the
rights of parties from many different states, are adjudicated in federal
courts, as Article III of the Constitution intends.
C. Do CAFA's Carve-Outs Alleviate Any Problems?
As part of the Senate compromise, 126 CAFA includes four
limitations on the definition of "mass action."'127 In particular, mass
122. VAIRO, supra note 99, at 35.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. § 1332(d)(7).
126. 151 CONG. REC. S1077 78 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (compromise proposed to Senator Frist by Senators Landrieu, Schumer,
Dodd, and Bingham).
127. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(ii).
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actions do not include claims (1) arising from an event or occurrence
which allegedly resulted in injuries in the State where the action was
filed or in contiguous States; (2) joined by the defendant; (3) filed on
behalf of the general public pursuant to a State statute specifically
authorizing such action; and (4) consolidated or coordinated solely
for pretrial proceedings. 128 While some of these exceptions are fairly
self-explanatory, others benefit from further explanation found in the
Congressional Record. That is, Congress made clear that these
exceptions should be construed narrowly, to prevent gaping
loopholes in the mass action context. 1
29
1. The local event or occurrence exception
"A local event or occurrence" is one that takes place wholly
within the confines of one state, with its effects felt in that state and
possibly adjacent states. 13 Representative Sensenbrenner referenced
a toxic spill case as an example of a "local event or occurrence":
[T]he first exception would apply only in a... truly local
single event with no substantial interstate effects. The
purpose of this exception is to allow cases involving
environmental torts, such as a chemical spill, to remain in
State court if both the event and the injuries were truly
local, even though there are some out-of-state defendants.
By contrast, this exception would not apply to a product
liability or insurance case. The sale of a product to
different people does not qualify as an event, and the
alleged injuries in such a case would be spread out over
more than one State or contiguous States even if all of the
plaintiffs in a particular case came from one single State.
1 31
This exception seems aimed at geographically and temporally
isolated events, like a toxic spill or a plane crash. It would not apply
to cases involving the claims of one hundred or more plaintiffs
harmed in significantly similar, yet independent events, such as an
adverse drug reaction among different patients.
128. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(ii)(l)-(IV).
129. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
130. § 1332(d)(I 1)(B)(ii)(1).
131. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
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2. A defendant cannot unilaterally remove the case to federal court
Under the second exception, claims joined by a defendant do not
qualify as mass actions. 132  Senator Durbin sought to amend this
exception to include claims joined by the court sua sponte.
133
Scholars point out that this exception would severely limit the
circumstances under which parties could invoke CAFA's mass action
provisions: 134  only if plaintiffs affirmatively joined their claims
federal rules or a state mass action rule (such as that in West
Virginia), or if a court took it upon itself to consolidate claims. If
defendants could remove a case to federal court after state courts
consolidated claims for judicial efficiency, it is unlikely Senator
Durbin would have removed his amendment from the Senate floor.'
35
Senator Lott suggested that the mass action provision should
extend only to claims joined by plaintiffs under Mississippi and West
Virginia mass action rules,' 36 or claims consolidated by courts
"forced" to do so when one attorney filed suit for many plaintiffs.
He did not intend to include cases filed according to a particular
procedural rule of consolidation, such as that of New Jersey.,
37
Interpreted narrowly, to apply only to cases filed by plaintiffs,
CAFA's mass action provisions would achieve Congress's larger
goal of ensuring that cases presenting the same problems as class
actions are susceptible to similar rules.
138
3. A case filed on behalf of the general public is not a mass action
Mass actions do not include claims "asserted on behalf of the
general public ... pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing
such action."'1 39 This exception applies to a very narrow class of
cases, such as those filed under the California Unfair Competition
132. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(1).
133. 151 CONG. REC. SI101 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
134. See VAIRO, supra note 99, at 36.
135. 151 CONG. REC. S1236 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement by Sen.
Durbin).
136. Miss. R. CTV. P. 20 (West 2005); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 20 (LexisNexis
2005).
137. 151 CONG. REC. S1235 36 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
138. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(1J) (2006).
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Law.140 In these cases, there are no individual or purported "class"
claims, and because this exception applies only when a statute
specifically authorizes claims on behalf of the general public, cases
filed under general state consumer fraud laws do not qualify. The
Congressional Record also supports this narrow reading.
Representative Sensenbrenner pointed out that if an action is brought
under a state consumer fraud statute, and that state does not have a
provision parallel to California's statute, the defendant could still
remove the case to federal court.14 1 Thus, this exception should be
read narrowly to include only those statutes, like California's, that
specifically delineate procedures for public officials to bring suit on
behalf of the general public. The majority of consumer fraud cases,
if qualified under CAFA, would be subject to federal jurisdiction.
4. State court sua sponte consolidation
The final mass action exception excludes claims consolidated or
coordinated only for pretrial purposes. 42  This exception permits
state courts to consolidate claims for the convenience of discovery,
pretrial motions, and other procedural measures, without losing
jurisdiction to a federal court. However, some states, including
California, 143 do not permit consolidation purely for pretrial
purposes. In these states, courts that consolidate claims for
efficiency risk defendant's removal of the entire case to federal court
under the theory that cases consolidated by courts-not just those
joined intentionally by plaintiffs-can be removed. If courts
construe the phrase "proposed to be tried jointly" to include only
claims joined by the plaintiff, this problem disappears-a result
arguably intended by Senator Durbin who removed the words "or sua
sponte" after Senator Lott clarified the meaning of "mass action.'
1 44
Thus, while this exception alleviates some potential judicial
inefficiency, it cannot eliminate the jurisdictional nightmare that
results when the claims of federal plaintiffs must exceed the $75,000
140. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West 2006).
141. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
142. § 1332(d)( 1)(B)(ii)(IV).
143. See CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 1048 (West 2006).
144. 151 CONG. REC. S1235-36 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
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amount in controversy requirement.
D. Conclusion and Recommendations
1. Conclusion
CAFA's drafters began with a noble goal: to permit federal
jurisdiction of cases of national importance. 45 Somewhere in the
legislative process, among partisan politics and compromises, 146 the
mass action provision became an outlet for the give-and-take that
accompanies any controversial measure. In the name of
compromise, Congress determined that the § 1332(a) amount in
controversy requirement would cause mass actions to resemble
individual actions. But, in light of the Exxon decision, the additional
amount in controversy requirement needlessly complicates the mass
action provision.
Federal courts could simplify CAFA's mass action provision if
they interpret its language to permit supplemental jurisdiction over
claims that do not exceed the $75,000 threshold. Although it may be
unorthodox for courts to rely on congressional intent when the
statute's plain language is unambiguous, Representative
Sensenbrenner explained that "this provision [the $75,000 threshold]
in no way is intended.., to narrow current jurisdictional rules.
Thus, if a Federal court believed it to be appropriate, the court could
apply supplemental jurisdiction in the mass action context as
well.' 47  Taking him at his word, a federal court could simply
interpret the problem away.
Yet, it might be more appropriate for Congress to take action.
Granted, CAFA was a heavily debated piece of legislation that
appeared in many incarnations, 148 and it might be politically difficult
to make additional changes to the statute. However, to simplify the
jurisdictional issues, Congress could either (1) eliminate the $75,000
requirement and treat mass actions like class actions (with the
145. § 1711 note (Findings and Purposes); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
146. See 151 CoNG. REC. S1078-79 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Dodd).
147. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
148. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 1-2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
3-5.
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safeguard that defendants may only remove claims joined by
plaintiffs) or less drastically, (2) rewrite the $75,000 requirement to
incorporate Exxon and specify that minimal diversity does not offend
the jurisdictional principles of § 1332(a). 1
49
While these proposed changes do not address all of CAFA's
mass action pitfalls, they could help simplify the one hundred
plaintiff requirement, 50 the $5 million aggregation requirement,'51 or
the mandatory and discretionary remand provisions.' 52 Sometimes,
especially in the statutory context, simplicity is its own greatest
reward.
153
2. CAFA applied as presently written
and with possible interpretation or revision
To demonstrate the various inconsistencies in CAFA's mass
action provisions and proposed clarifications, this section borrows
facts from Connerwood Healthcare, Inc. v. Estate of Herron,154 and
applies the mass action provision in its different incarnations.
In 1997, the estate of an elderly woman who died of salmonella
poisoning filed suit in an Indiana state court against a nursing
home.1 55  The plaintiff claimed wrongful death and sought class
action status for herself and two other nursing home residents who
succumbed to salmonella, as well as seventy other residents who
suffered lesser harm. Together, the plaintiffs sought damages for
negligence, emotional distress, and pain and suffering. 56 For the
purposes of this analysis, assume one hundred plaintiffs were joined
in a mass action' 57 (instead of seventy in a class action), and only
three plaintiffs claimed wrongful death.
149. § 1332.
150. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
151. § 1332(d)(6).
152. § 1332(d)(3), (4).
153. In the words of Mark Twain, "Plain question and plain answer make the
shortest road out of most perplexities." MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE
MISSISSIPPI (1883), reprinted in 2 THE UNABRIDGED MARK TWAN 358
(Lawrence Teacher ed., 1997).
154. 683 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
155. Id. at 1325.
156. Id.
157. See IND. TRIAL R. 20.
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a. The case under CAFA 's mass action provision "as is"
To remove the case to federal court, the defendant would first
have to show that the plaintiff sought to join one hundred or more
monetary claims involving common questions of law or fact. In this
case, an issue may arise as to whether all the claims involve common
questions of law or fact: the facts could be significantly more
damaging for the wrongful death claims than the other ninety-seven
plaintiffs claiming mere negligence. The trier of fact could impute
the more damaging facts to the lesser claims and thus award greater
damages to those plaintiffs. However, assuming the court found the
claims joinable, the defendant could then remove the entire case to
federal court.
The federal judge would then have to closely examine each
plaintiffs alleged amount in controversy. The court could assert
jurisdiction over only those plaintiffs whose claims in good faith
exceed $75,000. Based on the facts above, it is likely that only the
three plaintiffs who allege wrongful death would meet the amount in
controversy requirement, and thus the federal court could only
exercise jurisdiction over these three. The court must remand the
claims of the remaining ninety-seven plaintiffs to state court. Three
plaintiffs are a far cry from the one hundred originally required to
constitute a CAFA mass action or a large class action with national
significance.
The next question is whether the federal court should aggregate
the claims of all one hundred plaintiffs, or only those remaining in
federal court. Logic suggests that only the court should aggregate
the remaining federal claims because they represent the only amount
in controversy before the court. However, some scholars suggest
that neither dipping below the one hundred plaintiff requirement nor
the $5 million aggregate amount in controversy after remand would
divest the federal court of jurisdiction. 158 Federal courts have yet to
resolve this issue.
Next, the court must examine the citizenship of plaintiffs and
defendants and determine whether minimal diversity is satisfied and
whether the mandatory or discretionary remand provisions apply. In
this determination, should the federal court include the ninety-seven
plaintiffs whose claims it remanded to state court? Scholars do not
158. VAIRO, supra note 99, at 33-35.
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believe so, 15 9 but if local plaintiffs with small claims remanded to
state court count for citizenship purposes, attorneys may be able to
join several small claims of local plaintiffs and defeat CAFA
entirely. This issue, too, remains unresolved.
Finally, the court must determine whether any of the carve-outs
apply. Under the local event or occurrence exception, plaintiffs may
have a strong argument because the harm occurred in a single
location and injured many people simultaneously, similar to a plane
crash or toxic spill. If the court determines that the local event
exception does not apply, and CAFA's preliminary requirements are
met, the court should assert jurisdiction over the three wrongful
death claims. This would be the correct result because the defendant
did not join the claims, they were not filed on behalf of the general
public by the Attorney General, and they were not consolidated
merely for pretrial purposes.
Yet, this result begs the question whether the defendant actually
achieved anything by removing the case to federal court. Instead of
one case, the defendant would now have to defend in two separate
fora. In addition, the parties could waste much time and money
litigating these jurisdictional issues, even before the court has an
opportunity to address the merits of the case. This result-inefficient,
anomalous, and expensive-hardly seems consistent with CAFA's
purpose of expanding federal jurisdiction over cases that resemble
class actions where there is presumably less in-state bias. This same
counterproductive outcome would occur again and again, each time a
defendant attempts to remove a case under the mass action provision
of CAFA. Congress, or the federal courts, should take steps to
ensure a different, and perhaps better, result.
b. The case if Congress eliminates the $75,000 threshold
As the branch of government vested with legislative power,
1 60
Congress should ensure that federal courts do not spend scarce
judicial resources on preliminary jurisdictional issues. By redrafting
CAFA's mass action provision, Congress could give federal courts
jurisdiction over all one hundred claims, including the wrongful
death claims exceeding $75,000 and the smaller negligence claims
159. Id. at 34-35.
160. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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joined under Rule 20.
By removing the § 1332(a) amount in controversy requirement,
Congress could achieve the goal of treating mass actions, "class
actions in disguise,"'16 1 the same as true class actions. For the Herron
case, and others like it, obviating the additional amount in
controversy requirement would permit the federal court to assert
jurisdiction over all one hundred plaintiffs, and eliminate all
questions as to whether the case is still a mass action, which claims
to aggregate, and which plaintiffs to count for citizenship purposes.
Eliminating this requirement also prevents plaintiffs from joining
numerous small claims in an effort to circumvent CAFA. While
removing the $75,000 requirement may sound easy on paper, after
years of negotiation in the halls of Congress, it might not be
practicable. There are other, less politically charged means of
achieving similar ends.
c. The case if Congress or the courts
rewrite or construe CAFA to permit supplemental jurisdiction
Congress could incorporate Exxon's holding and rewrite the
mass action provision to permit § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction
over smaller claims joined by plaintiffs for the purposes of trial. In
the Herron case, the federal court could assert jurisdiction over those
smaller claims properly joined with the wrongful death claims. The
problems associated with the $75,000 requirement would cease to
exist, as they would if Congress entirely eliminated the requirement.
The only caveat here is that Congress should include a provision that
supplemental jurisdiction in conjunction with minimal diversity does
not violate the underlying principles of § 1332.
Finally, if Congress fails to take any action to remedy these
impending problems, the federal courts could look to Representative
Sensenbrenner's statement and find it appropriate, in the name of
judicial efficiency, to apply supplemental jurisdiction to smaller
claims in the mass action context. 162 This would require the least
political maneuvering, but it could inspire criticism that the federal
courts, instead of the legislature, reshaped CAFA's mass action
161. 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lott).
162. See 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
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provisions. In the Herron case, judicial reconfiguration of the mass
action provision would have the same result as a sweep of the
congressional pen. The problems associated with numerosity,
aggregation, citizenship, and policy would vanish. In light of this,
Congress, or the courts, should be proactive and resolve the issues
associated with CAFA's mass action provisions before they tie up
state and federal courts for time on end.
